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RECENT DECISIONS
Common Carriers-Public Utilities-Aerial Navigation-Before
a state court of last resort for the first time (in South Mississippi Airways
et al. v. Southern Airlines et al., 26 So. (2d) 455 (Miss., 1946)) is the
question whether the legislature intended to grant jurisdiction to the Public
Service Commission over air carriers or over only those means of transportation enumerated in the statute. The commission granted certificates of
convenience and necesssity to intrastate airlines over protest by existing airlines and railroads that the commission had no jurisdiction to regulate
common carriers by air. Applicants contended that the power was implied from constitutional andstatutory provisions.: The county court vacated the order but on appeal the instant court held that the commission
was without jurisdiction to regulate common carriers by air in the absence
of express statutory authority. The Mississippi appellate court reads the
term "other common carriers" to mean "other common carriers on land
and water," holding that a motor driven airplane is a motor vehicle but
that an air route is not a highway within the meaning of the statute (instant case at 461) .2 A similar problem arose when the automobile came
into use as a common carrier. Commissions originally established to regulate railroads extended their jurisdiction to motor carriers, both by liberal
construction of the broad language of constitutions and statutes, and by
specific legislation covering motor carriers;$ and generally, public service
commissions have been held to have jurisdiction over automobile common
carriers under general statutory provisions, but legislation specifically covering motor carriers has practically eliminated the question.4 It may be
expected that courts which liberally construed statutes to include motor
carriers are not likely to find obstacles to the inclusion of air carriers.
One factor, however, distinguishing the transition to regulation of air carriers from the earlier transition to automobiles is the extensive federal control of air commerce." The Mississippi appellate court refers to provisions
for federal regulation without commenting upon their significance (instant
case at 459). Jurisdiction over common carriers by air has been assumed
1.

MISS. CONST.

Art 7, § x86: "The legislature

. . .

shall enact laws for the

supervision of railroads, express, telephone, telegraph, sleeping car companies, and
other common carriers in this state, by commission or otherwise." Miss. CODE (1942)
§ 7639: "No common carrier by motor vehicle . . . shall engage in intrastate
operation on any highway within this state unless there is in force with respect to such
carrier a certificate of convenience and necessity issued by the commission authorizing
such operation."
2. The court relied upon the use in the statute of prepositions like "upon" and
"thereon" in reference to highways, and the failure of the legislature in 1938 to mention air carriers, to support the conclusion that air traffic was not contemplated. Instant case at 459-461.
3. Western Ass'n of Short Line Railroads v. R. R. Comm. of Calif., 173 Cal. 8o2,
'162 Pac. 391 (1916) ; Note (igig) I A. L. R. 146o.
4. Notes (1936) 103 A. L. R. 273, (1927) 51 A. L. R. 821. (i92o) 9 A. L. R.
IoI, (1919) I A. L. R. 146o.
5. 52 STAT. 1012 (1938), 49 U. S. C. §§401, 56o (1940) prohibits the operation

without an airworthiness certificate of any aircraft within the limits of any civil airway, or directly affecting, or endangering safety in interstate commerce.
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by commissions in a number of states without specific statutory authority."
In Pennsylvania and at least one other state, the commissions have been
granted jurisdiction over all common carriers, including aircraft, in unmistakable language.7 In other states the view is expressed that without specific legislation the commission has jurisdiction over rates of air carriers,
but no other regulatory power.8 Although the wording of the statute is
ambiguous and open to narrow construction, the uncontested extension of
jurisdiction by other state commissions indicates that the decision in the
instant case is against the general view. The problem is likely to be the
subject of litigation and specific legislation as intrastate air traffic increases. 9

Marriage: Common Law-Statutes-Judicial Dicta-Revival of
common law marriages took place in Pennsylvania when the Superior Court
in Buradus v. General Cement Products Company et al., 159 Pa. Super. 501
(1946) overruled dictum in the case of Fisher v. Sweet and McLain et al.,
154 Pa. Super. 216 (1944). In 1941 C and H without securing a physical
examination or license, performed acts which met all the requirements of a
common law marriage. In 1943 H died as a result of injuries sustained
in the course of his employment and C asserted, as his common law wife,
a claim for workman's compensation. The compensation board denied an
award believing itself bound by a 1944 Superior Court dictum in the Fisher
case 1 to the effect that thereafter no common law marriage would be valid
unless the parties passed a physical examination and secured a license pursuant to the Act of 1939.2 The lower court reviewing this decision de6. Arizona: Application of Century Pacific Lines before Corporation Comm.,
(1932) U. S. Av. R. i9o (Vigorous dissent by Commissioner C. R. Howe) ; Colorado: Application of Pike's Peak Air Commerce, Inc., before Public Utility Comm.,
(i930) U. S. Av. R. 253, 83 A. L. R. 338; Illinois: Application of Century Air Lines

before Commerce Comm., (1932) U. S. Av. R. 197; Opinion of Att'y Gen., June 14,

x944, (1944) U. S. Av. R. 46.

7. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 66, § 1102 (5): "'Common carrier' means
any and all persons or corporations . . . undertaking . . . for compensation . .
the transportation of passengers or property . . . by, through, over, above, or under
land, water, or air . . ."; NEV. ComP. LAws (Hillyer, 1929) § 61o6(a): "The pro-

visions of this act, and the term 'Public Utility' shall apply to . ..all railroads, cor-

porations, airships, automobiles

rier .

.

.

.

that shall do any business as a common car-

8. McKeage, The Calif. R. R. Comm. Has Jurisdiction Over Intrastate Rates and
Charges of Air Lines, (945) 33 CALIF. L.REV. 298; Mass.: Opinion of Att'y Gen.,
March 2o, 1944, (1944) U. S. Av. R. 5I. The opposing view is expressed in: Wolcott, Does the Jurisdiction of the Calif. R. R. Comm. Extend to Air Transportation?.
(1945) 33 CALIF. L. REV. 114; South Carolina: Opinion of Att'y Gen., Jan. 28, 1944,
(1945) U. S. Av. R. 162.

9.The report of the instant case does not indicate why, if compliance with requirements of the Civil Aeronautics Board will permit intrastate operation, airways companies should seek regulation by a state commission.

I. In an addendum to the opinion in Fisher v. Sweet and McClain et al., 154 Pa.
Super. 216 (1944), the court after stating that the problem was not raised or at issue
nevertheless considered that "it is within our province, however, to hold that a valid
marriage cannot hereafter be entered into in this commonwealth without first complying with the Act of 1939 and securing a marriage license pursuant to its provisions."
2. Act of May 17, 1939, P. L. 148, 48 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i93o) § 20, to the

effect that no license could be issued until there was on file with the clerk of Orphans'
Court a physician's statement that the applicant had been examined within 3o days of
date of application and had been found to be free from the disease. This act was repealed by Act of May 16, 1945, P. L. 577, § 513, and is replaced by Act of May 16,
1945, P. L. 577, § 6, 35 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) § 587.6, which is generally to

the same effect.
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clared the marriage valid on the grounds that it had been entered into prior
to the Fisher case (instant case at 503).

On appeal the judgment was

affirmed, and by dictum the court declared further, that the marriage was
valid notwithstanding the Act of 1939 since that act did not mention common law marriages and, therefore, could not affect their validity. This
court was fully aware that the practical necessity for the common law marriage had disappeared,3 and that today it is all too often used to convert4
illicit relationships into "honest" marriages for purely mercenary reasons.
It indicated in fact that the present case was not above suspicion on this
score (instant case at 503). Nevertheless, on the facts, it is clear that this
marriage was properly upheld. 5 This court, however, passed over the
grounds of the lower court by which both this marriage and the doctrine
of the Fisher case could have been sustained to state by way of dictum that
the prior dictum was not a proper statement of law,6 and was untenable.
This declaration is, in effect, a restatement of the validity of the common
law marriage in Pennsylvania. It may well be questioned whether any
great service was done by revitalizing a legal arrangement so fraught with
abuses. However, the court made its point clear. It now feels that if this7
abuse is to be destroyed it is the responsibility of the legislature to do so.
3. American recognition of the common-law marriage grew out of the difficulties
in our pioneer communities in securing the service of minister or magistrate. See
MADDON, PERSONS AND DomEsTIc RELATIONS (I93I)
RIAGE AND THE STATE (1929) 26.

50; RIcHMAN AND HALL, MAR-

4. "The doctrine of informal marriages favors the harlot and the adventuress and
paves the way for them to claim the rights of common law widows upon the death of
some man of wealth." Gilky, Validity of Connon Law Marriage in Oregon (1923) 3
ORE. L. REV. 28, 46. Over one-half of the American jurisdictions now refuse to recognize common law marriages. For a list of these jurisdictions see MADDEN, PERsoNs
AND DOMESTIc RELATIONS (1931) 51; 38 C. J., MARRIAGE, § 88 and yearly supplements
thereto.
5. "On any view, this is not a proper case in which to give effect to our dicta in
the Fisher case since the parties were married before the date of the decision." Instant
case at 504.
6. The Act of June 23, 1885, P. L. 146, 48 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) § 2,
declaring that no person should be joined in marriage until a license had been obtained,
is the controlling statute. It has never been contended that it applied to other than
ceremonial marriages. Licenses were never required by common law marriages. The
Act of 1939 relied on in the Fisher case dicta only declared that no license could be obtained without an examination, and made no reference to common law marriage. Ergo,
on the basis of the long accepted rule of statutory interpretation that the law in the
absence of an express declaration will presume that the Act did not intend any change
in the common law it follows that the validity of the common law must remain unimpaired. See Heaney v. Boro. of Mauch Chunk, 322 Pa. 487, 490, 185 A. 732 (1936).
Instant case at 506.
7. "But whether the suggestion of the Fisher case is to be given effect will be
exclusively for the legislature to determine." Instant case at 507.

